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Adversarial machine learning is an emerging field that focuses on studying vulnerabilities of machine learning
approaches in adversarial settings and developing techniques accordingly to make learning robust to adversar-
ial manipulations. It plays a vital role in various machine learning applications and has attracted tremendous
attention across different communities recently. In this paper, we explore different adversarial scenarios in the
context of quantum machine learning. We find that, similar to traditional classifiers based on classical neural
networks, quantum learning systems are likewise vulnerable to crafted adversarial examples, independent of
whether the input data is classical or quantum. In particular, we find that a quantum classifier that achieves
nearly the state-of-the-art accuracy can be conclusively deceived by adversarial examples obtained via adding
imperceptible perturbations to the original legitimate samples. This is explicitly demonstrated with quantum
adversarial learning in different scenarios, including classifying real-life images (e.g., handwritten digit images
in the dataset MNIST), learning phases of matter (such as, ferromagnetic/paramagnetic orders and symmetry
protected topological phases), and classifying quantum data. Furthermore, we show that based on the informa-
tion of the adversarial examples at hand, practical defense strategies can be designed to fight against a number
of different attacks. Our results uncover the notable vulnerability of quantum machine learning systems to ad-
versarial perturbations, which not only reveals a novel perspective in bridging machine learning and quantum
physics in theory but also provides valuable guidance for practical applications of quantum classifiers based on
both near-term and future quantum technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The interplay between machine learning and quantum
physics may lead to unprecedented perspectives for both fields
[1]. On the one hand, machine learning, or more broadly ar-
tificial intelligence, has progressed dramatically over the past
two decades [2, 3] and many problems that were extremely
challenging or even inaccessible to automated learning have
been solved successfully [4, 5]. This raises new possibilities
for utilizing machine learning to crack outstanding problems
in quantum science as well [1, 6–16]. On the other hand, the
idea of quantum computing has revolutionized theories and
implementations of computation, giving rise to new striking
opportunities to enhance, speed up or innovate machine learn-
ing with quantum devices, in turn [17–19]. This emergent
field is growing rapidly, and notable progress is made on a
daily basis. Yet, it is largely still in its infancy, and many
important issues remain barely explored [1, 17–19]. In this
paper, we study such an issue concerning quantum machine
learning in various adversarial scenarios. We show, with con-
crete examples, that quantum machine learning systems are
likewise vulnerable to adversarial perturbations (see Fig. 1 for
an illustration) and suitable countermeasures should be de-
signed to mitigate the threat associated with them.
In classical machine learning, the vulnerability of machine
learning to intentionally-crafted adversarial examples as well
as the design of proper defense strategies has been actively
investigated, giving rise to an emergent field of adversarial
machine learning [20–33]. Adversarial examples are inputs to
machine learning models that an attacker has crafted to cause
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FIG. 1. A schematic illustration of quantum adversarial machine
learning. (a) A quantum classifier that can successfully identify the
image of a panda as “panda” with the state-of-the-art accuracy. (b)
Adding a small amount of carefully-crafted noise will cause the same
quantum classifier to misclassify the slightly modified image, which
is indistinguishable from the original one to human eyes, into a “gib-
bon” with notable high confidence.
the model to make a mistake. The first seminal adversarial
example dates back to 2004 when Dalvi et al. studied the
techniques used by spammers to circumvent spam filters [34].
It was shown that linear classifiers could be easily fooled by
few carefully-crafted modifications (such as adding innocent
text or substituting synonyms for words that are common in
malignant message) in the content of the spam emails, with
no significant change of the meaning and readability of the
spam message. Since then, adversarial learning has attracted
enormous attention, and different attack and defense strategies
were proposed [22, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36]. More strikingly, adver-
sarial examples can even come in the form of imperceptibly
small perturbations to input data, such as making a human-
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2invisible change to every pixel in an image [21, 37, 38]. A
prominent example of this kind in the context of deep learning
was first observed by Szegedy et al. and has been nowadays
a celebrated prototype example that showcases the vulnerabil-
ity of machine learning in a dramatic way [21]: starting with
an image of a panda, an attacker may add a tiny amount of
carefully-crafted noise (which is imperceptible to the human
eye) to make the image be classified incorrectly as a gibbon
with notably high confidence. In fact, the existence of ad-
versarial examples is now widely believed to be ubiquitous in
classical machine learning. Almost all type of learning models
suffer from adversarial attacks, for a wide range of data types
including images, audio, text, and other inputs [23, 24]. From
a more theoretical computer science perspective, the vulner-
ability of classical classifiers to adversarial perturbations is
reminiscent of the “No Free Lunch” theorem—there exists an
intrinsic tension between adversarial robustness and general-
ization accuracy [39–41]. More precisely, it has been proved
recently that if the data distribution satisfies the W2 Talagrand
transportation-cost inequality (a general condition satisfied in
a large number of situations, such as the cases where the class-
conditional distribution has log-concave density or is the uni-
form measure on a compact Riemannian manifold with pos-
itive Ricci curvature), any classical classifier could be adver-
sarially deceived with high probability [42].
Meanwhile, over the past few years, a number of intriguing
quantum learning algorithms have been discovered [17, 43–
61], and some been demonstrated in proof-of-principle ex-
periments [62]. These algorithms exploit the unique enig-
matic properties of quantum phenomena (such as superposi-
tion and entanglement) and promise to have exponential ad-
vantages compared to their classical counterparts. Notable
examples include the HHL (Harrow-Hassidim-Lloyd) algo-
rithm [63], quantum principal component analysis [64], quan-
tum support-vector machine [65, 66], and quantum generative
model [58], etc. Despite this remarkable progress, quantum
learning within different adversarial scenarios remains largely
unexplored [67, 68]. A noteworthy step along this direction
has been made recently by Liu and Wittek [67], where they
showed in theory that a perturbation by an amount scaling in-
versely with the Hilbert space dimension of a quantum sys-
tem to be classified should be sufficient to cause a misclassi-
fication, indicating a fundamental trade-off between the ro-
bustness of the classification algorithms against adversarial
attacks and the potential quantum advantages we expect for
high-dimensional problems. Yet, in practice, it is unclear how
to obtain adversarial examples in a quantum learning system,
and the corresponding defense strategy is lacking as well.
In this paper, we study the vulnerability of quantum ma-
chine learning to various adversarial attacks, with a focus
on a specific learning model called quantum classifiers. We
show that, similar to traditional classifiers based on classical
neural networks, quantum classifiers are likewise vulnerable
to carefully-crafted adversarial examples, which are obtained
by adding imperceptible perturbations to the legitimate input
data. We carry out extensive numerical simulations for several
concrete examples, which cover different scenarios with di-
verse types of data (including handwritten digit images in the
dataset MNIST, simulated time-of-flight images in cold-atom
experiment, and quantum data from an one-dimensional trans-
verse field Ising model) and different attack strategies (such
as, fast gradient sign method [32], basic iterative method [27],
momentum iterative method [35], and projected gradient de-
scent [32] in the white-box attack setting, and transfer-attack
method [69] and zeroth-order optimization [33] in the black-
box attack setting, etc.) to obtain the adversarial perturbations.
Based on these adversarial examples, practical defense strate-
gies, such as adversarial training, can be developed to fight
against the corresponding attacks. We demonstrate that, after
the adversarial training, the robustness of the quantum clas-
sifier to the specific attack will increase significantly. Our re-
sults shed new light on the fledgling field of quantum machine
learning by uncovering the vulnerability aspect of quantum
classifiers with comprehensive numerical simulations, which
will provide valuable guidance for practical applications of
using quantum classifiers to solve intricate problems where
adversarial considerations are inevitable.
II. CLASSICAL ADVERSARIAL LEARNING AND
QUANTUM CLASSIFIERS: CONCEPTS AND NOTATIONS
Modern technologies based on machine learning (espe-
cially deep learning) and data-driven artificial intelligence
have achieved remarkable success in a broad spectrum of ap-
plication domains [2, 3], ranging from face/speech recogni-
tion, spam/malware detection, language translation, to self-
driving cars and autonomous robots, etc. This success raises
the illusion that machine learning is currently at a state to be
applied robustly and reliably on virtually any tasks. Yet, as
machine learning has found its way from labs to real world,
the security and integrity of its applications leads to more and
more serious concerns as well, especially for these applica-
tions in safety and security-critical environments [20, 23, 24],
such as self-driving cars, malware detection, biometric au-
thentication and medical diagnostics [70]. For instance, the
sign recognition system of a self-driving car may misclassify
a stop sign with a little dirt on it as a parking prohibition
sign, and subsequently result in a catastrophic accident. In
medical diagnostics, a deep neural network may incorrectly
identify a slightly-modified dermatoscopic image of a benign
melanocytic nevus as malignant with even 100% confidence
[71], leading to a possible medical disaster. To address these
crucial concerns and problems, a new field of adversarial ma-
chine learning has emerged to study vulnerabilities of differ-
ent machine learning approaches in various adversarial set-
tings and to develop appropriate techniques to make learning
more robust to adversarial manipulations [25].
This field has attracted considerable attention and is grow-
ing rapidly. In this paper, we take one step further to study
the vulnerabilities of quantum classifiers and possible strate-
gies to make them more robust to adversarial perturbations.
For simplicity and concreteness, we will only focus our dis-
cussion on supervised learning scenarios, although a gener-
alization to unsupervised cases is possible and worth sys-
tematic future investigations. We start with a brief intro-
3duction to the basic concepts, notations, and ideas of clas-
sical adversarial learning and quantum classifiers. In super-
vised learning, the training data is labeled beforehand: DN =
{(x(1), y(1)), · · · , (x(N), y(N))}, where x(i) (i = 1, · · · , N )
is the data to be classified and y(i) denotes its correspond-
ing label. The essential task of supervised learning is to learn
from the labeled data a model y = h(x; η) (a classifier) that
provides a general rule on how to assign labels to data outside
the training set [72]. This is usually accomplished by mini-
mizing certain loss function over some set of model param-
eters that are collectively denoted as η: minη LN (η), where
LN (η) = 1N
∑N
i=1 L(h(x
(i); η), y(i)) denotes the averaged
loss function over the training data set. To solve this min-
imization problem, different loss functions and optimization
methods have been developed. Each of them bearing its own
advantages and disadvantages, and the choice of which one to
use depends on the specific problem.
Unlike training the classifiers, generating adversarial exam-
ples is a different process, where we consider the model pa-
rameters η as fixed and instead optimize over the input space.
More specifically, we search for a perturbation δ within a
small region ∆, which can be added into the input sample
x(i) so as to maximize the loss function:
max
δ∈∆
L(h(x(i) + δ; η), y(i)), (1)
Here in order to ensure that the adversarial perturbation is not
completely changing the input data, we constrain δ to be from
a small region ∆, the choice of which is domain-specific and
vitally depends on the problem under consideration. A widely
adopted choice of ∆ is the `p-norm bound: ||δ||p ≤ , where
the `p-norm is defined as: ‖x‖p =
(∑N
i=1 ‖xi‖p
) 1
p
. In addi-
tion, since there is more than one way to attack machine learn-
ing systems, different classification schemes of the attacking
strategies have been proposed in adversarial machine learn-
ing [24, 25, 73, 74]. Here, we follow Ref. [25] and classify
attacks along the following three dimensions: timing (consid-
ering when the attack takes place, such as attacks on models
vs. on algorithms), information (considering what informa-
tion the attacker has about the learning model or algorithm,
such as white-box vs. black-box attacks), and goals (consider-
ing different reasons for attacking, such as targeted vs. untar-
geted attacks). We will not attempt to exhaust all possible at-
tacking scenarios, which is implausible due to its vastness and
complexity. Instead, we only focus on several types of attacks
that have already capture the essential messages we want to
deliver in this paper. In particular, along the “information" di-
mension, we consider white-box and black-box attacks. In the
white-box setting, the attacker has full information about the
learned model and the learning algorithm, whereas the black-
box setting assumes that the adversary does not have precise
information about either the model or the algorithm used by
the learner. In general, obtaining adversarial examples in the
black-box setting is more challenging. Along the “goals" di-
mension, we distinguish two major categories: targeted and
untargeted attacks. In a targeted attack, the attacker aims to
deceive the classifier into outputting a particularly targeted la-
bel. In contrast, untargeted attacks (also called reliability at-
tacks in the literature) just attempt to cause the classifier make
erroneous predictions, but no particular class is aimed. We
also mention that a number of different methods have been
proposed to solve the optimization problem in Eq. (1) or its
variants in different scenarios [23]. We refer to Refs. [21–
23, 25, 27, 31–33, 35, 36, 69, 75] for more technique details.
As for our purpose, we will mainly explore the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [32], basic iterative method (BIM)[27],
projected gradient descent (PGD) [32], and momentum itera-
tive method (MIM)[35] in the white-box setting and the trans-
fer attack [22], substitute model attack [31, 69], and zeroth-
order optimization (ZOO) attack [33] methods in the black-
box setting.
On the other hand, another major motivation for studying
adversarial learning is to develop proper defense strategies to
enhance the robustness of machine learning systems to adver-
sarial attacks. Along this direction, a number of countermea-
sures have been proposed as well in recent years [25]. For
instance, Kurakin et al. introduced the idea of adversarial
training [76], where the robustness of the targeted classifier is
enhanced by retraining with both the original legitimate data
and the crafted data. Samangouei et al. came up with a mech-
anism [77] that uses generative adversarial network [78] as a
countermeasure for adversarial perturbations. Papernot et al.
proposed a defensive mechanism [79] against adversarial ex-
amples based on distilling knowledge in neural networks [80].
Each of these proposed defense mechanisms works notably
well against particular classes of attacks, but none of them
could be used as a generic solution for all kinds of attacks. In
fact, we cannot expect a universal defense strategy that can
make all machine learning systems robust to all types of at-
tacks, as one strategy that closes a certain kind of attack will
unavoidably open another vulnerability for other types of at-
tacks which exploit the underlying defense mechanism. In this
work, we will use adversarial learning to enhance the robust-
ness of quantum classifiers against certain types of adversarial
perturbations.
Quantum classifiers are counterparts of classical ones that
run on quantum devices. In recent years, a number of different
approaches have been proposed to construct efficient quantum
classifiers [45, 47–57, 65, 81, 82], with some of them even
been implemented in proof-of-principle experiments. One
straightforward construction, called the quantum variational
classifier [45, 47, 49], is to use a variational quantum cir-
cuit to classify the data in a way analogous to the classical
support vector machines [72]. Variants of this type of clas-
sifiers include hierarchical quantum classifiers [55] (such as
these inspired by the structure of tree tensor network or multi-
scale entanglement renormalization ansatz) and quantum con-
volutional neural networks [53]. Another approach, called
the quantum kernel [50, 51, 81], utilizes the quantum Hilbert
space as the feature space for data and compute the kernel
function via quantum devices. Both the quantum variational
classifier and the quantum kernel approach have been demon-
strated in a recent experiment with superconducting qubits
[51]. In addition, hierarchical quantum classifiers have also
been implemented by using the IBM quantum experience [83]
and their robustness to depolarizing noises has been demon-
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FIG. 2. The sketch of a quantum circuit classifier. The classifier
consists of p layers, with each layer containing a rotation unit and
an entangler unit. The rotation unit performs arbitrary single-qubit
Euler rotations implemented as a combination of Z and X gates:
Uq,i(θ) = Zθcq,iXθbq,i
Zθaq,i with θ representing the Euler angles, q
identifying the qubit, and i = 1, 2, · · · , p referring to the label of
layers. The entangler unit entangles all qubits and is composed of a
series of CNOT gates. The initial state |ψ〉in, which is a n-qubit state,
encodes the complete information of the input data to be classified.
The projection measurement on the output qubits give the predicting
probability for each category and the input data is assigned a label
that bearing the largest probability.
strated in principle [55]. These experiments showcase the in-
triguing potentials of using the noisy intermediate-scale quan-
tum devices [84] (which are widely expected to be available in
the near future) to solve practical machine learning problems,
although an unambiguous demonstration of quantum advan-
tages is still lacking. Despite these exciting progresses, an
important question of both theoretical and experimental rel-
evance concerning the reliability of quantum classifiers re-
mains largely unexplored: are they robust to adversarial per-
turbations?
III. VULNERABILITY OF QUANTUM CLASSIFIERS
As advertised in the above discussion, quantum classifiers
are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. In this section,
we will first introduce the general structure of the quantum
classifiers and the learning algorithms used in this paper and
several attacking methods to obtain adversarial perturbations
with technique details provided in the Appendix. We then ap-
ply these methods to concrete examples to explicitly show the
vulnerability of quantum classifiers in diverse scenarios, in-
cluding quantum adversarial learning of real-life images (e.g.,
handwritten digit images in MNIST), topological phases of
matter, and quantum data from the ground states of physical
Hamiltonians.
A. Quantum classifiers: training and adversarial attacks
Quantum classifiers take quantum states as input. Thus,
when they are used to classify classical data, we need first to
convert classical data into quantum states. This can be done
with an encoding operation, which basically implements a
feature map from the D-dimensional Euclidean space (where
the class data is typically represented by D-dimensional vec-
tors) to the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space for n qubits: ϕ :
RD → C2n . There are two common ways of encoding clas-
sical data into quantum states: amplitude encoding and qubit
encoding [45, 48, 63–65, 85–90]. Amplitude encoder maps
an input vector x ∈ RD (with some possible preprocessing
such as normalization) directly into the amplitudes of the 2n-
dimensional ket vector |ψ〉in for n qubits in the computational
basis. Here, for simplicity, we assume thatD is a power of two
such that we can use D = 2n amplitudes of a n-qubit system
(in fact, if D < 2n we can add 2n −D zeros at the end of the
input vector to make it of length 2n). Such a converting pro-
cedure can be achieved with a circuit whose depth is linear in
the number of features in the input vectors with the routines
in Refs. [91–93]. With certain approximation or structure,
the required overhead can be reduced to polylogarithmic in D
[94, 95]. This encoding operation can also be made more effi-
cient by using more complicated approaches such as tensorial
feature maps [45]. Qubit encoder, in contrast, uses D (rather
than O(logD) as in amplitude encoding) qubits to encode the
input vector. We first rescale the data vectors element-wise to
lie in [0, pi2 ] and encode each element with a qubit using the
following scheme: |φd〉 = cos(xd)|0〉+ sin(xd)|1〉, where xd
is the d-th element of the rescaled vector. The total quantum
input state that encodes the data vectors is then a tensor prod-
uct |φ〉 = ⊗Dd=1|φd〉. Qubit encoding does not require a quan-
tum random access memory [89] or a complicated circuit to
prepare the highly entangled state |ψ〉in, but it demands much
more qubits to perform the encoding and hence is more chal-
lenging to numerically simulate the training and adversarial
attacking processes on a classical computer. As a result, we
will only focus on amplitude encoding in this work, but the
generalization to other encoding schemes is straightforward
and worth investigation in the future.
We choose a hardware-efficient quantum circuit classifi-
cation model, which has been used as a variational quan-
tum eigensolver for small molecules and quantum magnets
in a recent experiment with superconducting qubits [96]. The
schematic illustration of the model is shown in Fig. 2. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that the number of categories
to be classified is K and each class is labeled by an integer
number 1 ≤ k ≤ K. We use m qubits (2m−1 < K ≤ 2m)
to serve as output qubits that encode the category labels. A
convenient encoding strategy that turns discrete labels into a
vector of real numbers is the so-called one-hot encoding [72],
which converts a discrete input value 0 < k ≤ K into a vector
a ≡ (a1, · · · , a2m) of length 2m with ak = 1 and aj = 0 for
j 6= k. For the convenience of presentation, we will use y and
a interchangeably to denote the labels throughout the rest of
the paper. In such a circuit model , we first prepare the input
state to be |ψ〉in ⊗ |1〉⊗m with |ψ〉in a n-qubit state encoding
5the complete information of the data to be classified, and then
apply a unitary transform consisting of p layers of interleaved
operations. Each layer contains a rotation unit that performs
arbitrary single-qubit Euler rotations and an entangler layer
that generates entanglement between qubits. This generates a
variational wavefunction |Ψ(Θ)〉 = ∏pi=1 Ui(|ψ〉in⊗ |1〉⊗m),
where Ui = [
∏
q U
q
i (θi)]UENT = (
∏
q Zθqi,cXθ
q
i,b
Zθqi,a)UENT
denotes the unitary operation for the i-th layer. Here UENT
represents the unitary operation generated by the entangler
unit and we use θi to denote collectively all the parameters
in the i-th layer and Θ to denote collectively all the parame-
ters evolved in the whole model. We mention that the arbi-
trary single-qubit rotation together with the control-NOT gate
gives a universal gate set in quantum computation. Hence our
choice of this circuit classifier is universal as well, in the sense
that it can approximate any desired function as long as p is
large enough. One may choose other models, such as hierar-
chical quantum classifiers [55] or the quantum convolutional
neural network [53], and we expect that the attacking meth-
ods and the general conclusion should carry over straightfor-
wardly to these models.
During the training process, the variational parameters Θ
will be updated iteratively so as to minimize certain loss func-
tions. The measurement statistics on the output qubits will
determine the predicted label for the input data encoded in
state |ψ〉in. For example, in the case of two-category classifi-
cation, we can use y ∈ {0, 1} to label the two categories and
the number of output qubits is one. We estimate the probabil-
ity for each class by measuring the expectation values of the
projections: P (y = l) = Tr(ρout|l〉〈l|), where l = 0, 1 and
ρout = Tr1,··· ,n(|Ψ(Θ)〉〈Ψ(Θ)|) is the reduced density matrix
for the output qubit. We assign a label y = 0 to the data sam-
ple x if P (y = 0) is larger than P (y = 1) and say that x is
classified to be in the 0 category with probability P (y = 0) by
the classifier. The generalization to multi-category classifica-
tion is straightforward. One observation which may simplify
the numerical simulations a bit is that the diagonal elements
of ρout, denoted as g ≡ (g1, · · · , g2m) = diag(ρout), in fact
give all the probabilities for the corresponding categories.
In classical machine learning, a number of different loss
functions have been introduced for training the networks and
characterizing their performances. Different loss functions
possess their own pros and cons and are best suitable for dif-
ferent problems. For our purpose, we define the following
loss function based on cross-entropy for a single data sample
encoded as |ψ〉in:
L(h(|ψ〉in; Θ),a) = −
∑
k
ak log gk. (2)
During the training process, a classical optimizer is used to
search for the optimal parameters Θ∗ that minimize the av-
eraged loss function over the training data set: LN (Θ) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 L(h(|ψ〉(i)in ; Θ),a(i)). Various gradient descent algo-
rithms, such as the stochastic gradient descent [97] and quan-
tum natural gradient descent [98, 99], etc., can be employed
to do the optimization. We use Adam [100, 101], which is an
adaptive learning rate optimization algorithm designed specif-
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FIG. 3. A sketch of adding adversarial perturbations to the input
data for quantum classifiers. Throughout this paper, we mainly focus
on evasion attack [25], which is the most common type of attack in
adversarial learning. In this setting, the attacker attempts to deceive
the quantum classifiers by adjusting malicious samples during the
testing phase. Adding a tiny amount of adversarial noise can cause
quantum classifiers to make incorrect predictions.
ically for training deep neural networks, to train the quantum
classifiers.
A crucial quantity that plays a vital role in minimizing
LN (Θ) is its gradient with respect to model parameters. Inter-
estingly, owing to the special structures of our quantum classi-
fiers this quantity can be directly obtained from the projection
measurements through the following equality [59]:
∂〈LN (Θ)〉ϑ
∂ϑ
=
1
2
(〈LN (Θ)〉ϑ+pi2 − 〈LN (Θ)〉ϑ−pi2 ) , (3)
where ϑ denotes an arbitrary single parameter in our circuit
classifier and 〈LN (Θ)〉ξ (ξ = ϑ, ϑ + pi2 , and ϑ − pi2 ) repre-
sents the expectation value of LN (Θ) with the correspond-
ing parameter set to be ξ. We note that the equality in Eq.
(3) is exact, in sharp contrast to other models for quantum
variational classifiers where the gradients can only be approx-
imated by finite-difference methods in general. It has been
proved that an accurate gradient based on quantum measure-
ments could lead to substantially faster convergence to the op-
timum in many scenarios [102], in comparison with the finite-
difference method approach.
We now give a general recipe on how to generate adver-
sarial perturbations for quantum classifiers. Similar to the
case of classical adversarial learning, this task essentially re-
duces to another optimization problem where we search for
a small perturbation within an appropriate region ∆ that can
be added into the input data so that the loss function is max-
imized. A quantum classifier can classify both classical and
quantum data. Yet, adding perturbations to classical data is
equivalent to adding perturbations to the initial quantum state
|ψ〉in. Hence, it is sufficient to consider only perturbations to
|ψ〉in, regardless of whether the data to be classified is quan-
6tum or classical. A pictorial illustration of adding adversar-
ial perturbations to the input data for a quantum classifier is
shown in Fig. 3. In the case of untargeted attacks, we attempt
to search a perturbation operator Uδ acting on |ψ〉in to maxi-
mize the loss function:
Uδ ≡ argmax
Uδ∈∆
L(h(Uδ|ψ〉in; Θ∗),a), (4)
where Θ∗ denotes the fixed parameters determined during the
training process, |ψ〉in encodes the information of the data
sample x supposed to be under attack, and a represents the
correct label for x in the form of one-hot encoding. On the
other hand, in the case of targeted attacks we aim to search a
perturbation U (t)δ that minimizes (rather than maximizes) the
loss function under the condition that the predicted label is
targeted to be a particular one:
U
(t)
δ ≡ argmin
U
(t)
δ ∈∆
L(h(U
(t)
δ |ψ〉in; Θ∗),a(t)), (5)
where a(t) is the targeted label that is different from the correct
one a 6= a(t).
In general, ∆ can be a set of all unitaries that are close to
the identity operator. This corresponds to the additive attack in
classical adversarial machine learning, where we modify each
component of the data vector independently. In our simula-
tions, we use automatic differentiation [103], which computes
derivatives to machine precision, to implement this type of at-
tack. In addition, for simplicity we can further restrict ∆ to be
a set of products of local unitaries that are close to the iden-
tity operator. This corresponds to the functional adversarial
attack [104] in classical machine learning. It is clear that the
searching space for the functional attack is much smaller than
that for the additive attack and one may regard the former as
a special case for the later.
We numerically simulate the training and inference process
of the quantum classifiers on a classical cluster by using the
Julia language [105] and Yao.jl [106] framework. We run the
simulation parallelly on the CPUs or GPUs, depending on dif-
ferent scenarios. The parallel nature of the mini-batch gradi-
ent descent algorithm naturally fits the merits of GPUs and
thus we use CuYao.jl [107], which is a very efficient GPU im-
plementation of Yao.jl [106], to gain speedups for the cases
that are more resource-consuming. We find that the perfor-
mance of calculating mini-batch gradients on a single GPU is
ten times better than that of parallelly running on CPUs with
forty cores. The automatic differentiation is implemented with
Flux.jl [108] and Zygote.jl [109]. Based on this implementa-
tion, we can optimize over a large number of parameters for
circuit depth as large as p = 50. In general, we find that in-
creases in circuit depth (model capacity) are conducive to the
achieved accuracy. We check that the model does not overfit
because the loss of the training data set and validation data
set is close. So there is no need for introducing regularization
techniques such as Dropout [110] to avoid overfitting.
Now we have introduced the general structure of our quan-
tum classifiers and the methods to train them and to obtain ad-
versarial perturbations. In the following subsections, we will
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FIG. 4. The average accuracy and loss as a function of the number of
training steps. We use a depth-10 quantum classifier with structures
shown in Fig. 2 to perform binary classification for images of digits
1 and 9 in MNIST. To train the classifier, we use the Adam optimizer
with a batch size of 256 and a learning rate of 0.005 to minimize
the loss function in Eq. (2). The accuracy and loss are averaged on
11633 training samples and 1058 validation samples (which are not
contained in the training dataset).
demonstrate how these methods work by giving three concrete
examples. These examples explicitly showcase the extreme
vulnerability of quantum classifiers.
B. Quantum adversarial learning images
Quantum information processors possess unique properties
such as quantum parallelism and quantum superposition, mak-
ing them intriguing candidates for speeding up image recog-
nitions in machine learning. It has been shown that some
quantum image processing algorithms may achieve exponen-
tial speedups over their classical counterparts [111, 112]. Re-
searchers have employed quantum classifiers for many dif-
ferent image data sets [45]. Here, we focus on the MNIST
handwritten digit classification dataset [113], which is widely
considered to be a real-life testbed for new machine learn-
ing paradigms. For this dataset, near-perfect results have
been reached using various classical supervised learning algo-
rithms [114]. The MNIST data set consists of hand-drawn dig-
its, from 0 through 9 in the form of gray-scale images. Each
image is two dimensional, and contains 28 × 28 pixels. Each
pixel of an image in the dataset has a pixel-value, which is an
integer ranging from 0 to 255 with 0 meaning the darkest and
255 the whitest color. For our purpose, we slightly reduced
the size of the images from 28 × 28 pixels to 16 × 16 pixels,
so that we can simulate the training and attacking processes of
the quantum classifier with moderate classical computational
resources. In addition, we normalize these pixel values and
encode them into a pure quantum state using the amplitude
encoding method mentioned in Sec. III A.
We first train the quantum classifiers to identify different
images in the MNIST with sufficient classification accuracy.
The first case we consider is a two-category classification
problem, where we aim to classify the images of digits 1 and
9 by a quantum classifier with structures introduced shown in
Fig. 2 . From the MNIST dataset, we select out all images of 1
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FIG. 5. The average accuracy and loss for the four-category quantum
classifier as a function of the number of epochs. Here, we use a
quantum classifier with structures shown in Fig. 2 and depth forty
(p = 40) to perform multi-class classification for images of digits 1,
3, 7, and 9. To train the classifier, we use the Adam optimizer with
a batch size of 512 and learning rate of 0.005 to minimize the loss
function in Eq. (2). The accuracy and loss are averaged on 20000
training samples and 2000 validation samples.
and 9 to form a sub-dataset, which contains a training dataset
of size 11633 (used for training the quantum classifier), a val-
idation dataset of size 1058 (used for tuning hyperparameters,
such as the learning rate), and a testing set of size 2144 (used
for evaluating the final performance of the quantum classi-
fier). In Fig. 4, we plot the average accuracy and loss for
the training and validation datasets respectively as a function
of the number of epochs. From this figure, the accuracy for
both the training and validation increases rapidly at the begin-
ning of the training process and then saturate at a high value
of ≈ 98%. Meanwhile, the average loss for both training and
validation decreases as the number of epochs increases. The
difference between the training loss and validation loss is very
small, indicating that the model does not overfit. In addition,
the performance of the quantum classifier is also tested on the
testing set and we find that our classifier can achieve a notable
accuracy of 98% after around fifteen epochs.
For two-category classifications, the distinction between
targeted and untargeted attacks blurs since the target label can
only be simply the alternative label. Hence, in order to illus-
trate the vulnerability of quantum classifiers under targeted
attacks, we also need to consider a case of multi-category
classification. To this end, we train a quantum classifier to
distinguish four categories of handwritten digits: 1, 3, 7, and
9. Our results are plotted Fig. 5. Similar to the case of
two-category classification, we find that both the training and
validation accuracies increase rapidly at the beginning of the
training process and then saturate at a value of ≈ 92%, which
is smaller than that for the two-category case. After training,
the classifier is capable of predicting the corresponding digits
for the testing dataset with an accuracy of 91.6%. We men-
tion that one can further increase the accuracy for both the
two- and four-category classifications, by using the original
28 × 28-pixel images in MNIST or using a quantum classi-
fier with more layers. But this demands more computational
resources.
After training, we now fix the parameters of the correspond-
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FIG. 6. The clean and the corresponding adversarial images for
the quantum classifier generated by the basic iterative method (see
Appendix). Here, we apply the additive attack in the white-box un-
targeted setting. For the legitimate clean images, the quantum clas-
sifier can correctly predict their labels with confidence larger than
78%. After attacks, the classifier will misclassify the crafted images
of digit 1 (9) as digit 9 (1) with notably high confidence, although the
differences between the crafted and clean images are almost imper-
ceptible to human eyes. In fact, the average fidelity is 0.916, which
is very close to unity.
ing quantum classifiers and study the problem of how to gen-
erate adversarial examples in different situations. We consider
both the white-box and black-box attack scenarios. For the
white-box scenario, we explore both untargeted and targeted
attacks. For the black-box scenario, we first generate adver-
sarial examples for classical classifiers and show that quantum
classifiers are also vulnerable to these examples owing to the
transferability properties of adversarial examples.
1. White-box attack: untargeted
In the white-box setting, the attacker has full information
about the quantum classifiers and the learning algorithms. In
particular, the attacker knows the loss function that has been
used and hence can calculate its gradients with respect to the
parameters that characterize the perturbations. As a conse-
quence, we can use different gradient-based methods devel-
oped in the classical adversarial machine learning literature,
such as the FGSM [32], BIM [27], PGD [32], and MIM [35],
to generate adversarial examples. For untargeted attacks, the
attacker only attempts to cause the classifier to make incor-
rect predictions, but no particular class is aimed. In classical
adversarial learning, a well-known example in the white-box
untargeted scenario concerns facial biometric systems [115],
whereby wearing a pair of carefully-crafted eyeglasses the at-
tacker can have her face misidentified by the state-of-the-art
face-recognition system as any other arbitrary face (dodging
attacks). Here, we show that quantum classifiers are vulnera-
ble to such attacks as well.
For the simplest illustration, we first consider attacking ad-
ditively the two-category quantum classifier discussed above
in the withe-box untargeted setting. In Fig. 6, we randomly
choose samples for digits 1 and 9 from MNIST and then solve
the Eq. (4) iteratively by the BIM method to obtain their corre-
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FIG. 7. Effect of adversarial untargeted additive attacks on the ac-
curacy of the quantum classifier for the problem of classifying hand-
written digits. We use the basic iterative method to obtain adversar-
ial examples. The circuit depth of the model is 20. We choose the
step size as 0.1. (a)-(b) For the classifier that classifies digit 1 and
9, accuracy decreases as the average fidelity between the adversar-
ial samples and clean samples decreases. Accuracy decreases as we
increase the number of iterations of the attacking algorithm. (c)-(d)
Similar plots for the problem of classifying four digits 1, 3, 7, and 9.
sponding adversarial examples. This figure shows the original
clean images and their corresponding adversarial ones for the
two-category quantum classifier. For these particular clean
images, the quantum classifier can correctly assign their la-
bels with confidence larger than 78%. Yet, after attacks the
same classifier will misclassify the crafted images of digit 1
(9) as digit 9 (1) with decent high confidence 73%. Strikingly,
the obtained adversarial examples look the same as the orig-
inal legitimate samples. They only differ by a tiny amount
of noise that is almost imperceptible to human eyes. To fur-
ther verify that the vulnerability of the quantum classifier is
not specific to particular images, but rather generic for most
of (if not all) images in the dataset, we apply the same attack
to all images of digits 1 and 9 in the testing set of MNIST.
In Fig. 7(a), we plot the accuracy as a function of the num-
ber of the BIM iterations. It is clear from this figure that the
accuracy decreases rapidly at the beginning of the attack, indi-
cating that more and more adjusted images are misclassified.
After five BIM iterations, the accuracy decreases to zero and
all adjusted images become adversarial examples misclassi-
fied by the quantum classifier. In addition, to characterize how
close a clean legitimate image is to its adversarial counterpart
in the quantum framework, we define the fidelity between the
quantum states that encode them: F = |〈ψadv.|ψleg.〉|2, where
|ψadv.〉 and |ψleg.〉 denote the states that encode the legitimate
and adversarial sample, respectively. In Fig. 7(b), we com-
pute the average fidelity at each BIM iteration and plot the
accuracy as a function of average fidelity. Since the fidelity
TABLE I. Average fidelity (F¯ ) and accuracy (in %) of the quan-
tum classifier when being additively attacked by the BIM and FGSM
methods in the white-box untargeted setting. For the two-category
(four-category) classification, we use a model circuit of depth p = 10
(p = 40). For the BIM method, we generate adversarial examples
using three iterations with a step size of 0.1. We denote such at-
tack as BIM(3, 0.1). For the FGSM method, we generate adversarial
examples using a single step with a step size of 0.03 (0.05) for the
two-category (four-category) classifier. We denote such attacks as
FGSM(1, 0.03) and FGSM(1, 0.05), respectively.
Attacks F¯ Accuracy
two-
category
BIM (3, 0.1) 0.923 15.6%
FGSM (1, 0.03) 0.901 00.0%
four-
category
BIM (3, 0.1) 0.943 23.7%
FGSM (1, 0.05) 0.528 00.0%
basically measures the difference between the legitimate and
adversarial images, hence it is straightforward to obtain that
the accuracy will decrease as the average fidelity decreases.
This is explicitly demonstrated in Fig. 7(b). What is more
interesting is that even when the accuracy decreases to zero,
namely when all the adjusted images are misclassified, the av-
erage fidelity is still larger than 0.73. We mention that this
is a fairly high average fidelity, given that the Hilbert space
dimension of the quantum classifier is already very large.
In the above discussion, we have used Eq. (4), which is suit-
able for the untargeted attack, to generate adversarial exam-
ples. However, the problem we considered is a two-category
classification problem and the distinction between targeted
and untargeted attacks is ambiguous. A more unambiguous
approach is to consider untargeted attacks to the four-category
quantum classifier. Indeed, we have carried out such attacks
and our results are plotted in Fig. 7(c-d), which are simi-
lar to the corresponding results for the two-category scenar-
ios. Moreover, we can also consider utilizing different op-
timization methods to do white-box untargeted attacking for
the quantum classifiers. In Table I, we summarize the perfor-
mance of two different methods (BIM and FGSM) in attack-
ing both the two-category and four-category quantum classi-
fiers. Both the BIM and FGSM methods perform noticeably
well.
Now, we have demonstrated how to obtained adversarial ex-
amples for the quantum classifiers by additive attacks, where
each component of the data vectors are modified indepen-
dently. In real experiments, to realize such adversarial exam-
ples with quantum devices might be challenging because this
requires implementations of complicated global unitaries with
very high precision. To this end, a more practical approach is
to consider functional attacks, where the adversarial pertur-
bation operators are implemented with a layer of local uni-
tary transformations. In this case, the searching space is much
smaller than that for the additive attacks, hence we may not be
able to find the most efficient adversarial perturbations. Yet,
once we find the adversarial perturbations, it could be much
easier to realize such perturbations in the quantum laboratory.
To study functional attacks, in our numerical simulations we
consider adding a layer of local unitary transformations be-
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FIG. 8. Effects of adversarial untargeted functional attack on the ac-
curacy of the quantum classifier for the problem of classifying hand-
written digits 1 and 9. Here, the adversarial perturbation operators
are assumed to be a layer of local unitary transformation. We use
both the BIM method and the FGSM method to obtain adversarial
examples. (a) For the BIM method, we generated adversarial pertur-
bations using different number of iterations with the fixed step size
0.1. (b) For the FGSM method, we generate adversarial perturba-
tions using different step sizes, and the accuracy drops accordingly
with increasing step size.
fore sending the quantum states to the classifiers. We restrict
that these local unitaries are close to the identity operators so
as to keep the perturbations reasonably small. We apply both
the BIM and FGSM methods to solve Eq. (4) in the white-
box untargeted setting. Partial of our results for the case of
functional attacks are plotted in Fig. 8. From this figure, it is
easy to see that the performances of both the BIM and FGSM
methods are a bit poorer than that for the case of additive at-
tacks. For instance, in the case of functional attacks after six
BIM iterations there is still a residue accuracy about 14% [see
Fig. 8(a)], despite the fact that the average fidelity has already
decreased to 0.2 [see Fig. 8(c)]. This is in sharp contrast to the
case of additive attacks, where five BIM iterations are enough
to reduce the accuracy down to zero [see Fig. 7(a)] and mean-
while maintain the average fidelity larger than 0.73 [see Fig.
7(b)]. The reduction of the performances for both methods is
consistent with the fact that the searching space for functional
attacks are much smaller than that for additive attacks.
2. White-box attack: targeted
Unlike in the case of untargeted attacks, in targeted attacks
the attacker attempts to mislead the classifier to classify a data
sample incorrectly into a specific targeted category. A good
example that manifestly showcases the importance of targeted
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FIG. 9. Visual illustration of adversarial examples craf using
different attacks. From top to bottom: the clean and adversarial
images generated for the quantum classifier by the BIM algorithm.
By applying the additive attack, we can change the quantum clas-
sifier’s classification result. The top images represent an correctly
predicted legitimate example. The bottom images are incorrectly
predicted adversarial example, even though they bear a close resem-
blance to the clean image. Here, the attacking algorithm we em-
ployed is BIM(0.1,3)
attacks occurs in face recognition as well: in some situations
the attacker may attempt to disguise her face inconspicuously
to be recognized as an authorized user of a laptop or phone
that authenticates users through face recognition. This type of
attack has a particular name of impersonation attack in clas-
sical adversarial learning. It has been shown surprisingly in
Ref. [115] that physically realizable and inconspicuous im-
personation attacks can be carried out by wearing a pair of
carefully-crafted glasses designed for deceiving the state-of-
the-art face recognition systems. In this subsection, we show
that quantum classifiers are likewise vulnerable to targeted at-
tacks in the white-box setting.
We consider attacking the four-category quantum classifier.
In Fig. 9, we randomly choose samples for digits 1, 3, 7,
and 9 from MNIST and then solve the Eq. (5) iteratively
by the BIM method to obtain their corresponding adversar-
ial examples. This figure shows the original legitimate images
and their corresponding targeted adversarial ones for the four-
category quantum classifier. For these legitimate samples, the
quantum classifier can assign their labels correctly with high
confidence. But after targeted attacks, the same classifier is
misled to classify the crafted images of digits {7, 1, 3, 9} er-
roneously as the targeted digits {9, 3, 7, 7} with a decent high
confidence, despite the fact that the differences between the
crafted and legitimate images are almost imperceptible. To
further illustrate how this works, in Figs. 10 (a-d) we plot the
classification probabilities for each digit and the loss functions
with respect to particular digits as a function of the number of
epochs. Here, we randomly choose an image of a given digit
and then consider either additive [Figs. 10(a-b)] or functional
[Figs. 10(c-d)] targeted attacks through the BIM method. For
instance, in Fig. 10(a) the image we choose is an image for
digit 1 and the targeted label is digit 3. From this figure, at
the beginning the quantum classifier is able to correctly iden-
tify this image as digit 1 with probability P (y = 1) ≈ 0.41.
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FIG. 10. White-box targeted attacks for the four-category quantum
classifier with depth p = 40. (a) The classification probabilities for
each digits as a function of the number of attacking epochs. Here,
we use the BIM method to attack the quantum classifier. (b) The loss
for classifying the image to be 1 or 3 as a function of the number
of epochs. (c-d) Similar plots for the functional attacks. (e-f) The
accuracy as a function of the average fidelity during the attacking
process. Here, we consider additive attacks with both the BIM (e)
and FGSM (f) methods.
As the number of BIM iteration increases P (y = 1) de-
creases and P (y = 3) increases, and after about six iterations
P (y = 3) becomes larger than P (y = 1), indicating that the
classifier begins to be deceived into predict the image as a
digit 3. Fig. 10(b) shows the loss as a function of the number
of epochs. From this figure, as the iteration number increases,
the loss for classifying the image as digit 1 (3) increases (de-
creases), which is consistent with the classification probability
behaviors in Fig. 10(a).
More surprisingly, we can in fact fool the quantum classi-
fier to identify any images as a given targeted digit. This is
clearly observed from Figs. 10 (e-f) and Table II, where we
perform additive attacks for all the images of digits {1, 3, 7, 9}
with different targeted labels and different attacking methods.
In Figs. 10(e-f), we plot the accuracy versus the average fi-
delity. Here, for a given targeted label l (l = 1, 3, 7, or, 9), we
perform additive attacks for all images with original labels not
equal to l and compute the accuracy and the average fidelity
based on these images. From these figures, even when the
TABLE II. The accuracy αadv (in %) and average fidelity F¯ for the
four-category quantum classifier with depth p = 10 on the test
dataset when being attacked by different methods for different tar-
geted labels. Here, we consider additive attacks with both the BIM
and FGSM methods. For the BIM method, we generate adversarial
examples using three iterations with a step size of 0.05. Whereas, for
the FGSM method, we use a single step with step size of 0.03.
Attacks
Targets 1 3 7 9
BIM(3, 0.05) α
adv 5.7% 6.6% 2.7% 0.0%
F¯ 0.941 0.936 0.938 0.935
FGSM(1, 0.03) α
adv 2.1% 10.9% 15.7% 11.9%
F¯ 0.899 0.902 0.902 0.901
average fidelity maintains larger than 0.85 the accuracy can
indeed decrease to zero, indicating that all the images are clas-
sified by the quantum classifier incorrectly as digit l. In Ta-
ble II, we summarize the performance of the BIM and FGSM
methods in attacking the four-category quantum classifier in
the white-box targeted setting.
3. Black-box attack: transferability
Unlike white-box attacks, black-box attacks assume lim-
ited or even no information about the internal structures of the
classifiers and the learning algorithms. In classical adversarial
learning, two basic premises that make black-box attacks pos-
sible have been actively studied [73]: the transferability of the
adversarial examples and probing the behavior of the classi-
fier. Adversarial sample transferability is the property that an
adversarial example produced to deceive one specific learning
model can deceive another different model, even if their ar-
chitectures differ greatly or they are trained on different sets
of training data [21, 22, 31]. Whereas, probing is another im-
portant premise of the black-box attack that the attacker uses
the victim model as an oracle to label a synthetic training set
for training a substitute model, hence the attacker needs not
even collect a training set to mount the attack. Here, we study
the transferability of adversarial examples in a more exotic
setting, where we first generate adversarial examples for dif-
ferent classical classifiers and then investigate whether they
transfer to the quantum classifiers or not. This would have im-
portant future applications considering a situation where the
attacker may only have access to classical resources.
Our results are summarized in Table III. To obtain these re-
sults, we first train two classical classifiers, one based on a
convolutional neural network (CNN) and the other based on
a feedforward neural network (see Appendix. V for details),
with training data from the original MNIST dataset. Then we
use three different methods (i.e., BIM, FGSM, and MIM) to
produce adversarial examples in a white-box untargeted set-
ting for both classical classifiers separately. After these adver-
sarial examples are obtained, we evaluate the performance of
the trained quantum classifier on them. From Table III, it is
evident that the performance of the quantum classifier on the
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TABLE III. Black-box attacks to the quantum classifier. Here, the
adversarial examples are generated by three different methods (i.e.,
BIM, FGSM, and MIM) for two different classical classifiers, one
based on CNN and the other on FNN (see Appendix ). This ta-
ble shows the corresponding accuracy (in %) for each case on the
MNIST test dataset. We denote the predication accuracy of the clas-
sical neural networks (quantum classifier) on the test set as αC (αQ),
and the predication accuracy on the adversarial test set as αadvC (α
adv
Q ).
The accuracy of the quantum classifier drops significantly on the ad-
versarial examples generated for the classical neural networks.
Attacks
Accuracy
αadvC αC − αadvC αadvQ αQ − αadvQ
CNN
BIM (50, 0.01) 0.07% 98.2% 66.4% 25.6%
FGSM (1, 0.3) 0.6% 98.3% 51.6% 40.4%
MIM (10, 0.06) 0.7% 98.2% 62.3% 29.7%
FNN
BIM (50, 0.01) 0.6% 99.3% 68.1% 23.9%
FGSM (1, 0.3) 1.0% 98.9% 56.8% 35.2%
MIM (10, 0.06) 0.8% 99.1% 59.9% 32.1%
adversarial examples is much worse than that on the original
legitimate samples. For instance, for the adversarial exam-
ples generated for the CNN classifier by the MIM method,
the accuracy of the quantum classifier is only 62.3%, which is
29.7% lower than that for the clean legitimate samples. This
indicates roughly that 29.7% of the adversarial examples orig-
inally produced for attacking the CNN classifier transfer to
the quantum classifier. This transferability ratio may not be as
large as that for adversarial transferability between two clas-
sical classifiers. Yet, given the fact that the structure of the
quantum classifier is completely different from the classical
ones, it is in fact a bit surprising that such a high transferabil-
ity ratio can be achieved in reality. We expect that if we use
another quantum classifier to play as the surrogate classifier,
the transferability ratio might increase significantly. We leave
this interesting problem for future studies.
4. Adversarial perturbations are not random noises
The above discussions explicitly demonstrated the vulnera-
bility of quantum classifiers against adversarial perturbations.
The existence of adversarial examples is likewise a general
property for quantum learning systems with high-dimensional
Hilbert space. For almost all the images of hand-writing dig-
its in MNIST, there always exists at least one corresponding
adversarial example. Yet, it is worthwhile to clarify that adver-
sarial perturbations are not random noises. They are carefully-
engineered to mislead the quantum classifiers and in fact only
occupy a tiny subspace of the total Hilbert space. To demon-
strate this more explicitly, we compare the effects of random
noises on the accuracy of both two- and four-category quan-
tum classifiers with the effects of adversarial perturbations.
For simplicity and concreteness, we consider the uncorrelated
decoherence noises that occur in a number of experimental
platforms (such as, Rydberg atoms, superconducting qubits,
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FIG. 11. Effects of depolarizing noises with varying strength on the
accuracy of the quantum classifiers with depth p = 20. The mean
classification accuracy is computed on the test set with respect to
the fidelity between the original input states and the states affected
by depolarizing noises on each qubit with varying strengths. The
accuracy and fidelity are averaged over 1000 random realizations.
(a) Results for the two-category quantum classifier. (b) Results for
the four-category quantum classifier.
and trapped ions, etc.) for quantum computing [116–119]:
Edepl(ρ) = (1− β)ρ+ β
3
(σxρσx + σyρσy + σzρσz), (6)
where ρ denotes the density state of a qubit, σx,y,z are the
usual Pauli matrices, and β ∈ [0, 1] is a positive number char-
acterizing the strength of the decoherence noises.
In Fig. 11, we plot the classification accuracy of the quan-
tum classifiers versus the noise strength p and the average fi-
delity between the original state and the state affected by a sin-
gle layer of depolarizing noise on each qubit described by Eq.
6. From this figure, we observe that the accuracy for both the
two- and four-category quantum classifiers decreases roughly
linearly with the increase of p and the decrease of the average
fidelity. This is in sharp contrast to the case for adversarial
perturbations [see Fig. 10 (e-f), Fig. 8(c), and Fig. 7(b)(d) for
comparison], where the accuracy has a dramatic reduction as
the average fidelity begins to decrease from unity, indicating
that the adversarial perturbations are not random noises. In
fact, since the accuracy only decreases linearly with the aver-
age fidelity, this result also implies that quantum classifiers are
actually rather robust to random noises. We mention that one
may also consider the bit-flip or phase-flip noises and observe
similar results. The fact that the adversarial perturbations are
distinct from random noises is also reflected in our numerical
simulations of the defense strategy by data augmentation—
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FIG. 12. (a) The average accuracy and loss for the two-category
quantum classifier as a function of the number of epochs. Here, we
use a quantum classifier with structures shown in Fig. 2 and depth
ten (p = 10) to perform binary classification for topological/non-
topological phases. To train the classifier, we use the Adam opti-
mizer with a batch size of 512 and a learning rate of 0.005 to mini-
mize the loss function in Eq. (2). The accuracy and loss are averaged
on 19956 training samples and 6652 validation samples. (b) The ac-
curacy of the quantum classifier as a function of the iterations of the
BIM attack. Here, the BIM step size is 0.01.
we find that the performance of the quantum classifier is no-
ticeably better if we augment the training set by adversarial
examples, rather than samples with random noises.
C. Quantum adversarial learning topological phases of matter
Classifying different phases and the transitions between
them is one of the central problems in condensed matter
physics. Recently, various machine learning tools and tech-
niques have been adopted to tackle this intricate problem. In
particular, a number of supervised and unsupervised learn-
ing methods have been introduced to classify phases of mat-
ter and identify phase transitions [8, 10, 120–130], giving
rise to an emergent research frontier for machine learning
phases of matter. Following these theoretical approaches,
proof-of-principle experiments with different platforms [131–
134], such as doped CuO2 [134], electron spins in diamond
nitrogen-vacancy centers [131], and cold atoms in optical
lattices [132, 133], have been carried out in laboratories
to demonstrate their feasibility and unparalleled potentials.
In addition, the vulnerability of these machine learning ap-
proaches to adversarial perturbations has been pointed out in
a recent work as well [135]. It has been shown that typi-
cal phase classifiers based on classical deep neural networks
are extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks: adding a tiny
amount of carefully-crafted noises or even just changing a sin-
gle pixel of the legitimate sample may cause the classifier
to make erroneous predictions with a surprisingly high con-
fidence level.
Despite these exciting progresses made in the area of ma-
chine learning phases of matter, most previous approaches
are based on classical classifiers and using quantum classi-
fiers to classify different phases and transitions still remains
barely explored hitherto. Here, in this section we study
the problem of using quantum classifiers to classify differ-
ent phases of matter, with a focus on topological phases
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FIG. 13. The clean and the corresponding adversarial time-of-
flight images for using the quantum classifier to classify topological
phases. (Top) A legitimate sample of the density distribution in mo-
mentum space for the lower band with lattice size 10× 10. (Bottom)
An adversarial example obtained by the fast gradient sign method,
which only differs with the original one by a tiny amount of noises
that are imperceptible to human eyes.
that are widely believed to be more challenging than con-
ventional symmetry-breaking phases (such as the paramag-
netic/ferromagnetic phases) for machine-learning approaches
[120, 128, 129, 136]. We show, through a concrete ex-
ample, that the quantum classifiers are likewise vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations. We consider the following 2D
square-lattice model for quantum anomalous Hall (QAH) ef-
fect, where a combination of spontaneous magnetization and
spin-orbit coupling leads to quantized Hall conductivity in the
absence of an external magnetic field:
HQAH = J
(x)
SO
∑
r
[(c†r↑cr+xˆ↓ − c†r↑cr−xˆ↓) + H.c.] (7)
+ iJ
(y)
SO
∑
r
[(c†r↑cr+yˆ↓ − c†r↑cr−yˆ↓) + H.c.]
− t
∑
〈r,s〉
(c†r↑cs↑ − c†r↓cs↓) + µ
∑
r
(c†r↑cr↑ − c†r↓cr↓).
Here c†rσ (crσ) is the fermionic creation (annihilation) opera-
tor with pseudospin σ = (↑, ↓) at site r, and xˆ, yˆ are unit lat-
tice vectors along the x, y directions. The first two terms de-
scribe the spin-orbit coupling with J (x)SO and J
(y)
SO denoting its
strength along the x and y directions, respectively. The third
and the fourth terms denote respectively the spin-conserved
nearest-neighbor hopping and the on-site Zeeman interaction.
In momentum space, this Hamiltonian has two Bloch bands
and the topological structure of this model can be character-
ized by the first Chern number:
C1 = − 1
2pi
∫
BZ
dkxdkyFxy(k), (8)
where Fxy denotes the Berry curvature Fxy(k) ≡
∂kxAy(k) − ∂kyAx(k) with the Berry connection Aµ(k) ≡
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TABLE IV. Average fidelity F¯ and accuracy (in %) of the two-
category quantum classifier with depth p = 10 when being attacked
by the BIM and FGSM methods in the white-box untargeted setting.
Here, the accuracy and fidelity are averaged over 2000 testing sam-
ples.
Attacks F¯ Accuracy
BIM (3, 0.01) 0.988 31.6%
FGSM (1, 0.03) 0.952 6.3%
〈ϕ(k)|i∂kµ |ϕ(k)〉 [µ = x, y and ϕ(k) is the Bloch wavefunc-
tion of the lower band], and the integration is over the whole
first Brillouin zone (BZ). It is straightforward to obtain that
C1 = − sign(µ) when 0 < |µ| < 4t and C1 = 0 otherwise.
The above Hamiltonian can be implemented with syn-
thetic spin-orbit couplings in cold-atom experiment [137] and
the topological index C1 can be obtained from the standard
time-of-flight images [138, 139]. Indeed, by using ultra-
cold fermionic atoms in a periodically modulated optical hon-
eycomb lattice, the experimental realization of the Haldane
model, which bears similar physics and Hamiltonian struc-
tures as in Eq. (8), has been reported [140]. For our purpose,
we first train a two-category quantum classifier to assign la-
bels of C1 = 0 or C1 = 1 to the time-of-flight images. To
obtain the training data, we diagonalize the Hamiltonian in
Eq. (7) with an open boundary condition and calculate the
atomic density distributions with different spin bases for the
lower band. These density distributions can be directly mea-
sured through the time-of-flight imaging techniques in cold
atom experiments and serve as our input data. We vary λSO
and t in both the topological and topologically trivial regions
to generate several thousand of data samples. Similar as in the
above discussion on identifying images of hand-writing dig-
its, we use amplitude encoding to convert the data for density
distributions to the input quantum states for the quantum clas-
sifier. In Fig. 12(a), we plot the average accuracy and loss as a
function of the number of epochs. It shows that after training,
the quantum classifier can successfully identify the time-of-
flight images with reasonably high accuracy. Yet, we note that
this accuracy is a bit lower than that for the case of classify-
ing paramagnetic/ferromagnetic phases discussed in the next
section, which is consistent with the general belief that topo-
logical phases are harder to learning.
Unlike the conventional phases or the hand-writing digit
images, topological phases are described by nonlocal topo-
logical invariants (such as the first Chern number), rather than
local order parameters. Thus, intuitively the obtaining of ad-
versarial examples might also be more challenging, since the
topological invariants capture only the global properties of the
systems and are insensitive to local perturbations. Yet, here
we show that adversarial examples do exist in this case and the
quantum classifier is indeed vulnerable in learning topological
phases. To obtain adversarial examples, we consider attacking
the quantum classifier additively in the white-box untargeted
setting. Partial of our results are plotted in Fig. 12(b). From
this figure, the accuracy for the quantum classifier in classify-
ing time-of-flight images decreases rapidly as the number of
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FIG. 14. The average accuracy and loss function as a function of
the number of training steps. We use a depth-10 quantum classifier
with structures shown in Fig. 2 to classify the ferromagnetic/param-
agnetic phases for the ground states ofHIsing. We plot the accuracy of
1182 training samples and 395 validation samples (which are not in
the training dataset). We present the results of the first 200 iteration
epochs. The learning rate is 0.005. The difference between the train-
ing loss and validation loss is very small, indicating that the quantum
classifier does not overfit. The final accuracy on the 395 test samples
is roughly (98%).
attacking iterations increases and after about six iterations it
becomes less than 0.4, indicating that more than 60% the at-
tacked images in the test set are misclassified. To illustrate this
even more concretely, in Fig.13 we randomly choose a time-
of-flight image and then solve the Eq. (4) iteratively by the
BIM method to obtain its corresponding adversarial examples.
Again, as shown in this figure the obtained adversarial exam-
ple looks like the same as the clean legitimate time-of-flight
image. They differ only by a tiny amount of perturbation that
is imperceptible to human eyes. In addition, we summarize
the performance of two different methods (BIM and FGSM)
in attacking the quantum classifier in Table IV. Both the BIM
and FGSM methods perform noticeably well.
D. Adversarial learning quantum data
In the above discussion, we considered using quantum clas-
sifiers to classify classical data (images) and studied their
vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations. This may have
important applications in solving practical machine learning
problems in our daily life. However, in such a scenario a pre-
requisite is to first transfer classical data to quantum states,
which may require certain costly processes or techniques
(such as quantum random access memories [89]) and thus ren-
ders the potential quantum speedups nullified [90]. Unlike
classical classifiers that can only take classical data as input,
quantum classifiers can also classify directly quantum states
produced by quantum devices. Indeed, it has been shown that
certain quantum classifiers, such as quantum principal com-
ponent analysis [141] and quantum support vector machine
[65], could offer an exponential speedup over their classical
counterparts in classifying quantum data directly. In this sub-
section, we consider the vulnerability of quantum classifiers
in classifying quantum states.
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FIG. 15. Effect of additive adversarial attack on the accuracy of
the two-category quantum classifier in classifying the ferromagnet-
ic/paramagnetic phases for the ground states of the transverse field
Ising model. We use both the BIM and FGSM methods to gener-
ate adversarial examples in the white-box untargeted setting. For the
BIM method, we fix the step size to be 0.05 and the iteration num-
ber to be ten. For the FGSM method, we perform the attack using
a single step but with step size ranging from 0.1 to 1.0. The circuit
depth of the quantum classifier being attacked is p = 10 and the sys-
tem size for the Ising model is L = 8. (a) The results for the BIM
attack. (b) The accuracy as a function of average fidelity between
the legitimate and adversarial samples for both the BIM and FGSM
methods.
For simplicity and concreteness, we consider the following
1D transverse field Ising model:
HIsing = −
L−1∑
i=1
σzi σ
z
i+1 − Jx
L∑
i=1
σxi , (9)
where σzi and σ
x
i are the usual Pauli matrices acting on the i-
th spin and Jx is a positive parameter describing the strength
of the transverse field. This model maps to free fermions
through a Jordan–Wigner transformation and is exactly solv-
able. At zero temperature, it features a well-understood quan-
tum phase transition at Jx = 1, between a paramagnetic phase
for Jx > 1 and a ferromagnetic phase for Jx < 1. It is an ex-
emplary toy model for studying quantum phase transitions and
an excellent testbed for different new methods and techniques.
Here, we use a quantum classifier, with structures shown in
Fig. 2, to classify the ground states of HIsing with varying
Jx (from Jx = 0 to Jx = 2) and show that this approach is
extremely vulnerable to adversarial perturbations as well.
To generate the data sets for training, validation, and test-
ing, we sample a series of Hamiltonians with varying Jx
from 0 to 2 and calculating their corresponding ground states,
which are used as input data to the quantum classifier. We
train the quantum classifier with the generated training dataset
and our results for training is shown in Fig. 14. Strikingly, our
quantum classifier is very efficient in classifying these ground
states of HIsing into categories of paramagnetic/ferromagnetic
phases and we find that a model circuit with depth p = 5 is
enough to achieve near-perfect classification accuracy. This is
in contrast to the case of learning topological phases, where a
quantum classifier with depth p = 10 only gives an accuracy
of around 90%. In addition, we mention that one can also use
the quantum classifier to study the quantum phase transition.
Similar to the cases for classical input data, the quantum
classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in classi-
fying quantum data as well. To show this more explicitly, we
consider attacking the above quantum classifier trained with
quantum inputs additively in the white-box untargeted setting.
Partial of our results are plotted in Fig. 15. In Fig. 15(a),
we plot the accuracy as a function of the number of the BIM
iterations and find that it decreases to zero after ten BIM iter-
ations, indicating that all the slightly-adjusted quantum states,
including even these far away from the phase transition point,
are misclassified by the quantum classifier. In Fig. 15(b), we
plot the accuracy as a function of averaged fidelity for differ-
ent attacking methods. From this figure, both the BIM and
FGSM methods are notably effective in this scenario and the
accuracy of the quantum classifier on the generated adversar-
ial examples decreases to zero, whereas the average fidelity
maintains moderately large for both methods.
IV. DEFENSE: QUANTUM ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
In the above discussions, we have explicitly shown that
quantum classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial perturba-
tions. This may raise serious concerns about the reliability
and security of quantum learning systems, especially for these
applications that are safety and security-critical, such as self-
driving cars and biometric authentications. Thus, it is of both
fundamental and practical importance to study possible de-
fense strategies to increase the robustness of quantum classi-
fiers to adversarial perturbations.
In general, adversarial examples are hard to defend against
because of the following two reasons. First, it is difficult to
build a precise theoretical model for the adversarial example
crafting process. This is a highly non-linear and non-convex
sophisticated optimization process and we lack proper theo-
retical tools to analyse this process, making it notoriously hard
to obtain any theoretical argument that a particular defense
strategy will rule out a set of adversarial examples. Second,
defending adversarial examples requires the learning system
to produce proper outputs for every possible input, the num-
ber of which typically scales exponentially with the size of
the problem. Most of the time, the machine learning models
work very well but only for a very small ratio of all the pos-
sible inputs. Nevertheless, in the field of classical adversarial
machine learning, a variety of defense strategies have been
proposed in recent years to mitigate the effect of adversar-
ial attacks, including adversarial training [76], gradient hiding
[142], defensive distillation [79], and defense-GAN [77], etc.
Each of these strategies has its own advantages and disadvan-
tages and none of them is adaptive to all types of adversarial
attacks. In this section, we study the problem of how to in-
crease the robustness of quantum classifiers against adversar-
ial perturbations. We adopt one of the simplest and effective
methods, namely adversarial training, to the case of quantum
learning and show that it can significantly enhance the perfor-
mance of quantum classifiers in defending adversarial attacks.
The basic idea of adversarial training is to strengthen model
robustness by injecting adversarial examples into the train-
ing set. It is a straightforward brute force approach where
one simply generates a lot of adversarial examples using one
15
0 20 40 60 80 100
Epoch
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A
cc
ur
ac
y
leg. samples (train)
leg. samples (val)
adv. samples (test)
FIG. 16. Strengthening the robustness of the quantum classifier
against adversarial perturbations by quantum adversarial training. In
each epoch, we first generate adequate adversarial examples with the
BIM method for the quantum classifier with the current model pa-
rameters. The iteration number is set to be three and the BIM step
size is set to be 0.05. Then, we train the quantum classifier with both
the legitimate and crafted samples. The circuit depth of the quantum
classifier is ten and the learning rate is set to be 0.005.
or more chosen attacking strategies and then retrain the clas-
sifier with both the legitimate and adversarial samples. For
our purpose, we employ a robust optimization [143] approach
and reduce the task to solving a typical min-max optimization
problem:
min
Θ
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
Uδ∈∆
L(h(Uδ|ψ〉(i)in ); Θ), y(i)), (10)
where |ψ〉(i)in is the i-th sample under attack, and y(i) denotes
its original corresponding label. The meaning of Eq. (10) is
clear: we are training the quantum classifier to minimize the
adversarial risk, which is described by the average loss for
the worst-case perturbations of the input samples. We men-
tion that this min-max formulation has already been exten-
sively studied in the field of robust optimization and many
methods for solving such min-max problems have been de-
veloped [143]. One efficient method is to split Eq. (10) into
two parts: the outer minimization and the inner maximization.
The inner maximization problem is exactly the same problem
of generating adversarial perturbations, which have discussed
in detail in Sec. II and Sec. III. The outer minimization task
boils down to a task of minimizing the loss function on ad-
versarial examples. With this in mind, we develop a three-
step procedure to solve the total optimization problem. In the
first step, we randomly choose a batch of input samples |ψ〉(i)in
together with their corresponding labels y(i). Then, we cal-
culate the ‘worst-case’ perturbation of |ψ〉(i)in with respect to
the current model parameters Θt. That is to solve: Uδ∗ =
argmaxUδ∈∆ L(h(Uδ|ψ〉; Θ), y(i)). In the third step, we up-
date the parameters Θt according to the minimization problem
at Uδ∗ |ψ〉in: Θt+1 = Θt − η∇ΘL
(
h(Uδ∗ |ψ〉(i)in ; Θt), y(i)
)
.
We repeat these three steps until the accuracy converges to a
reasonable value.
Partial of our results are shown in Fig. 16. In this figure,
we consider the adversarial training of a quantum classifier
in identifying handwritten digits in MNIST. We use the BIM
method in the white-box untargeted setting to generate adver-
sarial examples. We use 20000 clean images and generate
their corresponding adversarial images. The clean images and
the adversarial ones together form the training data set, and
another 2000 images are used for the testing. From this figure,
it is evident that, after adversarial training, the accuracy of the
quantum classifier for both the adversarial samples and legiti-
mate samples increases significantly. At the beginning of the
training, the accuracy for the adversarial samples in the testing
set remains zero. This is because the initial model parameters
are randomly chosen, so the quantum classifier does not learn
enough information and its performance on even legitimate
samples is still very poor at the beginning (hence for each
sample it is always possible to find an adversarial example
by the BIM method, resulting in a zero accuracy on the test-
ing set of adversarial examples). After the early stage of the
adversarial training, this accuracy begins to increase rapidly
and the quantum classifier is able to classify more and more
crafted samples correctly. In other words, the BIM attack be-
comes less and less effective on more and more samples. At
the end of the training, the accuracies for both the legitimate
and adversarial data sets converge to a saturated value larger
than 98%, indicating that the adversarially retrained quantum
classifier is immune to the adversarial examples generated by
the BIM attack. We also notice that, due to the competition
between the inner maximization and outer minimization, the
accuracies for the legitimate data sets for training and valida-
tion both have an oscillation at the beginning of the adversarial
training process.
The above example explicitly shows that adversarial train-
ing can indeed increase the robustness of quantum classifiers
against a certain type of adversarial perturbations. Yet, it is
worthwhile to mention that the adversarially trained quantum
classifier may only perform well on adversarial examples that
are generated by the same attacking method. It does not per-
form as well when a different attack strategy is used by the
attacker. In addition, adversarial training tends to make the
quantum classifier more robust to white-box attacks than to
black-box attacks due to gradient masking [31, 142]. In fact,
we expect no universal defense strategy that is adaptive to all
types of adversarial attacks, as one approach may block one
kind of attack for the quantum classifier but will inevitably
leave another vulnerability open to an attacker who knows
and makes use of the underlying defense mechanism. In the
field of classical adversarial learning, a novel intriguing de-
fense mechanism that is effective against both white-box and
black-box attacks has been proposed recently [77]. This strat-
egy is called defense-GAN, which leverages the representative
power of GAN to diminish the effect of adversarial perturba-
tions via projecting input data onto the range of the GAN’s
generator before feeding it to the classifier. More recently, a
quantum version of GAN (dubbed QGAN) has been theoreti-
cally proposed [43, 44] and a proof-of-principle experimental
realization of QGAN has been reported with superconducting
quantum circuits [62]. Likewise, it would be interesting and
important to develop a defense-QGAN strategy to enhance the
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robustness of quantum classifiers against adversarial perturba-
tions. We leave this interesting topic for future study.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In summary, we have systematically studied the vulnera-
bility of quantum classifiers to adversarial examples in differ-
ent scenarios. We found that, similar to classical classifiers
based on deep neural networks, quantum classifiers are like-
wise extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks: adding a tiny
amount of carefully-crafted perturbations, which are imper-
ceptible to human eyes or ineffective to conventional meth-
ods, into the original legitimate data (either classical or quan-
tum mechanical) will cause the quantum classifiers to make
incorrect predictions with a notably high confidence level. We
introduced a generic recipe on how to generate adversarial
perturbations for quantum classifiers with different attacking
methods and gave three concrete examples in different adver-
sarial settings, including classifying real-life handwritten digit
images in MNIST, simulated time-of-flight images for topo-
logical phases of matter, and quantum ground states for study-
ing the paramagnetic/ferromagnetic quantum phase transition.
In addition, through adversarial training, we have shown that
the vulnerability of quantum classifiers to specific types of ad-
versarial perturbations can be significantly suppressed. Our
discussion is mainly focused on supervised learning based on
quantum circuit classifiers, but its generalizations to the case
of unsupervised learning and other types of quantum clas-
sifiers are possible and straightforward. Our results reveal
a novel vulnerability aspect for quantum machine learning
systems to adversarial perturbations, which would be crucial
for practical applications of quantum classifiers in the realms
of both artificial intelligence and machine learning phases of
matter as well.
It is worthwhile to clarify the differences between the quan-
tum adversarial learning discussed in this paper and the quan-
tum generative adversarial networks (QGAN) studied in pre-
vious works [43, 44, 46, 62, 144]. A QGAN contains two
major components, a generator and a discriminator, which are
trained alternatively in the way of an adversarial game: at each
learning round, the discriminator optimizes her strategies to
identify the fake data produced by the generator, whereas the
generator updates his strategies to fool the discriminator. At
the end of the training, such an adversarial procedure will end
up at a Nash equilibrium point, where the generator produces
data that match the statistics of the true data from the original
training set and the discriminator can no longer distinguish
the fake data with a probability larger than one half. The ma-
jor goal of QGAN is to produce new data (either classical or
quantum mechanical) that match the statistics of the training
data, rather than to generate adversarial examples that are en-
dowed with wild patterns.
This work only reveals the tip of the iceberg. Many im-
portant questions remain unexplored and deserve further in-
vestigations. First, the existence of adversarial examples
seems to be a fundamental feature of quantum machine
learning applications in high-dimensional spaces [67] due
to the concentration of measure phenomenon [145]. Thus,
we expect that various machine learning approaches to a
variety of high-dimensional problems, such as separability-
entanglement classification [146, 147], quantum state discrim-
ination [148], quantum Hamiltonian learning [149], and quan-
tum state tomography [7, 150], should also be vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. Yet, in practice how to find out all
possible adversarial perturbations in these scenarios and de-
velop appropriate countermeasures feasible in experiments to
strengthen the reliability of these approaches still remain un-
clear. Second, in classical adversarial learning a strong “No
Free Lunch" theorem has been established recently[39–41],
which shows that there exists an intrinsic tension between ad-
versarial robustness and generalization accuracy. In the future,
it would be interesting and important to prove a quantum ver-
sion of such a profound theorem and study its implications in
practical applications of quantum technologies. In addition,
there seems to be a deep connection between the existence
of adversarial perturbations in quantum deep learning and the
phenomenon of orthogonality catastrophe in quantum many-
body physics [151, 152], where adding a week local perturba-
tion into a metallic or many-body localized Hamiltonian will
make the ground state of the slightly-modified Hamiltonian
orthogonal to that of the original one in the thermodynamic
limit. A thorough investigation of this will provide new in-
sight into the understanding of both adversarial learning and
orthogonality catastrophe. Finally, an experimental demon-
stration of quantum adversarial learning should be a crucial
step towards practical applications of quantum technologies
in artificial intelligence in the future.
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Appendix A: Attack Algorithms
As mentioned in the main text, the type of attacks we con-
sider is mainly evasion attack from the perspective of attack
surface. Evasion attack is the most common type of attack in
classical adversarial learning [25]. In this setting, the attacker
attempts to deceive the classifier by adjusting malicious sam-
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Algorithm 1 Quantum-adopted Fast Gradient Sign Method
Input The trained quantum classifier h, loss function L, the legiti-
mate sample (|ψ〉in,a).
Input The perturbation bound 
Output An adversarial example x∗.
1: Input |ψ〉in into F to obtain∇xL(h(|ψ〉; Θ∗),a)
2: for Every component xi of |ψ〉in do
3: δi =  · sign(∇xiL(h(|ψ〉in; Θ∗),a)
4: x∗i = xi + δi
5: end for
6: return x∗ or its equivalent |ψ〉∗
ples during the testing phase. This setting assumes no modi-
fication of the training data, which is in sharp contrast to poi-
soning attack, where the adversary tries to poison the training
data by injecting carefully-crafted samples to compromise the
whole learning process. Within the evasion-attack umbrella,
the attacks considered in this paper can be further categorized
into additive or functional, targeted or untargeted, and white-
box or black-box attacks along different classification dimen-
sions. Here, in this Appendix, we give more technique details
about the attack algorithms used.
1. White-box attacks
White-box attacks assume full information about the clas-
sifier, so the attacker can exploit the gradient of the loss func-
tion: ∇xL(h(x + δ; θ), y). For the convenience and concise-
ness of the presentation, we will use x (y) and |ψ〉in (a) inter-
changeably to represent the input data (corresponding label)
throughout the whole Appendix sections. Based on the infor-
mation of gradients, a number of methods have been proposed
in the classical adversarial learning community to generate ad-
versarial samples. In this work, we adopt some of these meth-
ods to the quantum setting, including the FGSM, BIM, and
PGD methods. In the following, we introduce these methods
one by one and provide a pseudocode for each method.
Quantum-adapted FGSM method (Q-FGSM).—The FGSM
method is a simple one-step scheme for obtaining adversarial
examples and has been widely used in the classical adversar-
ial machine learning community [22, 32]. It calculates the
gradient of the loss function with respect to the input of the
classifier. The adversarial examples are generated using the
following equation:
x∗ = x +  · sign(∇xL(h(|ψ〉in; Θ∗),a)), (A1)
where L(h(|ψ〉in; Θ∗),a) is the loss function of the trained
quantum classifier,  is the perturbation bound, ∇x denotes
the gradient of the loss with respect to a legitimate sample x
with correct label a, and x∗ denotes the generated adversarial
example corresponding to x. For the case of additive attacks,
where we modify each component of the data vector indepen-
dently, ∇x is computed componentwise and a normalization
of the data vector will be performed if necessary. For the case
Algorithm 2 Quantum-adapted Basic Iterative Method
Input The trained model h, loss function L, the legitimate sample
(|ψ〉in,a).
Input The perturbation bound , iteration number T , decay factor
µ, upper and lower bound xmin, xmax.
Output An adversarial example |ψ〉∗.
1: |ψ〉∗0 = |ψ〉in
2: α = 
T
3: for k = 1, . . . , T do
4: Input |ψ〉i−1 into F to obtain bk = ∇xL(h(|ψ〉k−1; θ),a)
5: for Every component (xk)j of |ψ〉∗k−1 do
6: δj = α · sign((bk)j)
7: (xk)j = (xk−1)j + δj
8: end for
9: (xk) = piC(xk)
10: end for
11: return |ψ〉∗ = |ψ〉T
of functional attacks, we use a layer of parametrized local uni-
taries to implement the perturbations to the input data |ψ〉in. In
this case, ∇x is implemented via the gradient of the loss with
respect to the parameters defining the local unitaries. The Eq.
(A1) should be understood as:
ω∗ =  · sign(∇ωL(h(U(ω)|ψ〉in; Θ∗),a), (A2)
|ψ〉adv = U(ω∗)|ψ〉in, (A3)
where ω denotes collectively all the parameters for the local
unitaries. A pseudocode representation of the Q-FGSM algo-
rithm for the case of additive attacks is shown in Algorithm
1. The pseudocode for the case of functional attacks is similar
and straightforward, thus been omitted for brevity.
Quantum-adapted BIM method (Q-BIM).—The BIM
method is a straightforward extension of the basic FGSM
method [27]. It generates adversarial examples by iteratively
applying the FGSM method with a small step size α:
x∗k+1 = piC [x
∗
k + α · sign (∇xL (h(|ψ〉∗k; Θ∗),a))],(A4)
where x∗k denotes the modified sample at step k and piC is
projection operator that normalizes the wavefunction. A pseu-
docode representation of the Q-BIM algorithm for the case of
additive attacks is shown in Algorithm 2.
2. Black-box attacks: transfer attack
Unlike in the white-box setting, black-box attacks assume
that the adversary does not have full information about either
the model or the algorithm used by the learner. In particu-
lar, the adversary does not have the information about the loss
function used by the quantum classifier, thus cannot use the
gradient-based attacking methods to generate adversarial ex-
amples. Yet, for simplicity we do assume that the attacker
has access to a vast dataset to train a local substitute clas-
sifier that approximates the decision boundary of the target
classifier. Once the substitute classifier is trained with high
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TABLE V. Model architectures for the classical neural networks. (a)
The CNN architecture consists of three layers: a 2D convolution
layer, an activational ReLu layer [155], and a fully-connected flat-
tening layer with 0.5 dropout regularization. The last layer is then
connected to the final softmax classifier, which outputs the proba-
bility for each possible handwritten digit. In our case, we have four
categories: 1, 3, 7, 9. (b) The feedforward neural network architec-
ture consists of fully-connected layers and dropout [110] layers with
a dropping rate 0.1, which are important for avoiding overfitting.
Classifier based on CNN Classifier based on FNN
Conv(64,8,8)+ReLu FC(512)+ReLu
Conv(128,4,4)+ReLu Dropout(0.1)
Conv(128,2,2)+ReLu FC(53)+ReLu
Flatten Dropout(0.1)
FC(4)+Softmax FC(4)+Softmax
confidence, any white-box attack strategy can be applied on
it to generate adversarial examples, which can be used to de-
ceive the target classifier due to the transferability property of
adversarial examples. In this work, we consider the transfer
attack in a more exotic setting, where we use different classi-
cal classifiers as the local substitute classifier to generate ad-
versarial examples for the quantum classifier. The two clas-
sical classifiers are based on the CNN and FNN, respectively.
In Table V, we show the detailed structures of the CNN and
FNN. To train these two classical classifiers, we use the Adam
optimizer [100] and a batch size of 256. The learning rate
is set to be 10−3 during training. The corresponding learn-
ing process is implemented using Keras [153], a high-level
deep learning library running on top of the TensorFlow frame-
work [154]. After training, both the CNN and FNN classifiers
achieve a remarkably high accuracy on the legitimate testing
dataset (98.9% and 99.9% respectively, see Table III in the
main text).
We use three different methods, namely the BIM, FGSM
and MIM methods, to attack both the CNN and FNN clas-
sifiers in a white-box setting to obtain adversarial examples.
These attacks are implemented by using of Cleverhans [156].
For the BIM attack, the number of attack iteration is set to be
ten and the step size α is set to be 0.01. For the FGSM at-
tack, the number of iteration is one and the step size is set
to be 0.3. For the MIM method, the number of attack it-
erations is set to be ten, the step size is set to be 0.06, and
the decay factor µ is set to be 1.0. A detailed description of
the MIM method, together with a pseudocode, can be find in
Ref. [135]. The performance of both classifiers on the cor-
responding sets of adversarial examples is shown in Table III
in the main text, from which it is clear that the attack is very
effective (the accuracy for both classifiers decreases to a value
less than 1%). After the adversarial examples were generated,
we test the performance of the quantum classifiers on them
and find that its accuracy decrease noticeably (see Table III in
the main text).
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